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Abstract
One central debate in recent literature on epistemic 
normativity concerns the epistemic norm for action. This 
paper argues that this debate is afflicted by a category 
mistake: strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an 
epistemic norm for action. To this effect, I introduce a 
distinction between epistemic norms and norms with 
epistemic content; I argue that, while it is plausible that 
norms of the latter type will govern action in general, 
epistemic norms will only govern actions characteristically 
associated with delivering epistemic goods.
1. Introduction
One central debate in recent literature on epistemic normativity concerns the 
epistemic norm for action. Several people think that, where one’s choice is p-
dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting 
only if you know that p1 (e.g. Hawthorne and Stanley (2008)). The most notable
competing account puts forth a Bayesian expected utility maximization norm, 
according to which it is rational to choose an act only if it maximizes expected 
utility with respect to one’s credences and utilities (e.g. Douven (2008)).2
This paper argues that the debate is afflicted by a category mistake: strictly 
speaking, there is no such thing as an epistemic norm for action. To this effect, 
I will first put forth a distinction that has been largely overlooked in the 
literature, between epistemic norms and norms with epistemic content. Further 
on, I will offer a pretty straightforward way to tell their requirements apart (§2). 
In §3 I will argue that, inasmuch as actions lack a characteristic epistemic 
function, they are not governed by epistemic norms, but by other (prudential, 
moral etc.) norms with epistemic content. This result will also shed new light 
1While I will focus on the necessity direction of the norm, everything I say goes for the 
sufficiency direction, and therefore the biconditional version, too.
2 For an overview of the debate, see Benton (2014). For recent work, see Littlejohn and Turri 
(eds.) (2014).
2on the debate concerning the assertion-action commonality assumption, i.e., the 
claim that action and assertion are governed by one and the same epistemic
norm. Finally, in §5 I briefly discuss the impact of the present result on the 
normativity of practical reasoning.
2. Epistemic Norms and Norms with Epistemic Content
Let us, on a first approximation, formulate the norm we are talking about as 
follows:
The X Norm for Action (XNA): One is in a good enough epistemic position to 
act on p only if p has X.
Now, as we have seen, there is no consensus in the literature as to what 
property X is supposed to stand for, whether it is knowledge, expected utility 
maximization or what have you. Many3 people, though, take it that XNA is a 
3 There are a few important exceptions (many thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this 
out). In particular, when it comes to the views defended by Tim Williamson (e.g. 2000) and 
Jeremy Fantl and Matt McGrath (e.g. 2002), whether they will eventually make the proper 
subject of this paper will depend a lot on the details.
The Williamson view does not take the norm for action to be of a particular type or another; 
rather, an action based on less than knowledge is, according to Williamson (pc), in a crucial 
way, malfunctional. Note, though, that it is not clear that this explanation will let Williamson 
off the hook when it comes to committing to typing his preferred nor. After all, functions are 
typed; therefore, so is malfunctioning. Something can be epistemically malfunctional, 
prudentially malfunctional and so on. Of course, for many traits, actions and artifacts, there will 
be such a thing as a central function associated with them. Failure to function properly in view 
of fulfilling this central function will often be referred to as merely malfunctioning. However, 
this still refers to the failure of properly functioning in view of fulfilling a function of a 
particular type – i.e, the central function associated with the artifact, trait or action in question. 
Take hearts, for instance: it seems proper to say that a non-beating heart s malfunctional. What 
this amounts to, however, is saying that it fails to properly function towards fulfilling its main 
function, which is the biological function of pumping blood.  
On the Fantl&McGrath view, propriety of using p as a premise in practical reasoning and 
treating p as a reason for action can come apart from properly acting in the light of p in many 
ways; as such, they need not be committed to their being epistemic requirements on action. 
Plausibly, the view is perfectly compatible with a picture where it is fine to act on lottery 
propositions (say, sell your ticket) while, at the same time, it is impermissible to use such 
propositions in practical reasoning, or treat them as reasons for action, in virtue of not having 
knowledge-level justification. As such, while the view does want to say that epistemic 
requirements govern practical reasoning and treating p as a reason for action, it does not 
commit to the claim that action itself is the proper subject of epistemic evaluation. 
Two things about this. First, I am in strong agreement with Fantl and McGrath concerning 
there being an epistemic norm governing practical reasoning, independently of any such norm 
governing action. More about this in Section #4 below. Secondly, though, depending on how it 
will be spelled out, I worry about ‘treating p as a reason for action’ not being the proper subject 
of epistemic requirements either, for just the same reasons as action: it is not clear to me what 
3distinctively epistemic norm; according to Matt Benton, for instance, “[…]
when one faces a decision over whether to act that depends on the truth of some 
proposition, then acting without knowing that proposition can seem 
epistemically suspect and deserving of criticism” (Benton 2014). According to 
Jason Stanley (2016), also, “[r]ational action, practical reasoning, intentional 
action, and skilled action all plausibly involve epistemic norms” . Similarly, 
Martin Montminy argues that “[i]t is epistemically appropriate to act on the 
belief that p if and only if that belief counts as knowledge” (2012, 63). Also in 
support of a knowledge norm, John Hawthorne wonders whether winners of a 
bet with extremely good odds are “epistemically laudable for taking the bet” 
(John Hawthorne 2004, 175).
Foes of the knowledge norm also agree about the genuine epistemic nature 
of the requirement on action at stake. According to Mikkel Gerken, for 
instance, “[..] if the profiles of epistemic assessment for action and assertion 
are relevantly similar, it is prima facie evidence for the assumption that the 
relevant epistemic norms are also relevantly similar” (Gerken 2014, 726). 
Furthermore, there is one more thing several4 people involved in the debate 
seem to agree on: XNA is an epistemic norm in virtue of the fact that it 
concerns is how good one’s epistemic position needs to be vis-à-vis p in order 
to make acting on p permissible. Thus, both sides of the debate seem to stand 
behind the following principle:
The Epistemic Support Principle (ESP): If a norm N determines the amount of 
epistemic support needed for proper -ing, then N is an epistemic norm. 
One can find ESP both implicitly and explicitly assumed in several places 
the literature discussing the epistemic normativity of belief, assertion or action 
in the last decade.5 What this section will argue is that, insofar as epistemic 
normativity behaves like other types of normativity, ESP is false, and, 
therefore, XNA need not be an epistemic norm.
the epistemic function associated with either the former or the latter might be. Again, a lot will 
hinge on the details.
4 For exceptions, see anti-contextualist pragmatic warranted assertability maneuvers a la e.g.
Rysiew (2001) and Brown (2006)). For explicit doubts about this recipe for individuating 
epistemic norms, see e.g. Hazlett, McKenna and Pollock (2012).
5 For the implicit assumption, see e.g. Gerken (2014), Benton (2014). Often, ESP is also 
explicitly endorsed; take, e.g., the following passages: “[T]he problem with the agents in the 
above cases is that it is not epistemically appropriate for them to flat-out assert that p […]. One 
reason this is clear is that the criticism of the agents concerns the grounds for their assertions  
(Lackey 2013, 38); “Assertions are governed by an alethic or an epistemic norm – that is, a 
norm that specifies that it is appropriate to assert something only if what is asserted is true, or 
justifiably believed, or certain or known” (Maitra 2011, 277).
4Let us look at what is the case with other types of norms; consider driving. 
One traffic norm is the one regulating speed limit within city bounds. However, 
just because a norm is regulating speed limit, it need not follow that it is a 
traffic norm. Say you are driving your sister to work and traffic norms have it 
that you are supposed to drive at most 50 km/h within city bounds. And you are
respecting the norm: you are driving 50 km/h. Now say that your sister gets 
carsick at that speed, and asks you to drive a bit slower, under 30 km/h. It looks 
as if that’s the all-things-considered proper thing to do in this situation. Still, 
according to the traffic norm, you can just go on driving 50km/h. The moral 
norm, however, overrides the traffic norm and renders driving 50 km/h all-
things-considered inappropriate. Or say you are the only one who can defuse a 
bomb placed in center town, which would otherwise kill thousands. Surely 
driving 70 km/h, inasmuch as that’s what’s required for you to be there in time, 
is the all-things-considered proper thing to do. The prudential norm overrides 
the traffic norm when it comes to what the appropriate speed is in this situation.
Thus, it looks as if just because a norm regulates how speedily you can 
drive, it does not follow that it is a traffic norm. Notice, too, that the case of 
driving is hardly isolated; similar examples can be construed for many types of 
action, provided that the norms in question regulate how much of a gradable 
property one’s action needs to enjoy in order to be permissible. When 
permissible action requires more or less of a gradable property G, all norms N 
regulating that particular type of action can fix the threshold for N-proper 
performance lower or higher on the G spectrum: it can be prudentially or 
morally appropriate to drive faster or slower, to have a better or a worse grade 
average, to speak louder or more quietly etc. Just because a norm is regulating 
the appropriate speed, it need not follow that it is a traffic norm; just because a 
norm regulates the appropriate tone of one’s voice, it need not follow it is a 
norm of etiquette; and so on.
Now, action is certainly governed by many norms – prudential and moral 
norms are the most obvious candidates – and justification is a gradable 
property. Therefore, unless we are given reasons to believe epistemic 
normativity is somehow special in this respect,6 we should expect norms 
regulating the degree of justification required for proper action to make no 
exception; we should expect that just because a norm N affects the amount of 
warrant needed for proper action, it need not follow that N is an epistemic 
norm. Just like in the case of driving, where a moral norm determined how fast 
one could go, further norms can decide the amount of warrant needed for 
6 As far as I can tell, there is no argument to this effect in the literature. If the point made by this 
paper goes through, there is reason to believe that we should not trust the prospects of one 
offering such an argument either.
5proper action. The fact that a norm regulates the appropriate speed does not 
imply it is a traffic norm, and, similarly, the fact that a norm regulates the 
appropriate amount of epistemic support does not imply it is an epistemic norm. 
ESP is thus false: just because a norm regulates the amount of warrant needed 
for proper action, it need not follow that it regulates the amount of warrant 
needed for epistemically proper action.
Given that ESP is false, however, there is no reason to think that XNA is an 
epistemic norm for action. Recall XNA: ‘One is in a good enough epistemic 
position to act on p only if p has X’. With ESP out of the picture, good enough 
epistemic position need not mean epistemically good enough, that is, it need not 
mean good enough by the epistemic norm. One can be in a prudentially good 
enough epistemic position, a morally good enough epistemic position and so 
on. The fact that a norm has epistemic content does not make it into an
epistemic norm.
Here is one natural worry that might arise at this point: Is the distinction
concerning epistemic norms vs. norms with epistemic content merely 
terminological? What hinges on this distinction? Even if this paper is right, 
couldn’t we just continue using ‘epistemic norm’ as standing for ‘norm with 
epistemic content’? 
The answer is ‘no’; first and foremost, because this would get us in trouble 
when it comes to fit with the general normative landscape, if we do individuate 
other types of norms along different lines. To see how this is a problem, take, 
for instance, the debate over pragmatic encroachment: is it the case that whether 
we know depends on practical matters? It is easy to see that, to the aim of
finding the right answer to this question, distinguishing between genuinely 
epistemic and merely practical norms is likely to make all the difference. That 
is, what we want in support of the latter is reasons to believe genuinely 
epistemic normativity suffers from pragmatic encroachment; if the claim would 
be merely that norms with epistemic content can be prudential, well, it would 
likely turn out to be trivially true.
3. Actions and Characteristic Epistemic Goals
The previous section has shown that ESP is false and, hence, that there is no 
reason to believe that XNA captures an epistemic norm. This section argues 
that XNA is actually not an epistemic norm.
To see this, let us ask the following question: if the above distinction 
between epistemic norms and norms with epistemic content is correct, how is 
6one to distinguish the requirements pertaining to norms of the former sort from
the requirements pertaining to norms of the latter sort? 
Here is a fairly straightforward way to go about it: notice that a norm’s 
pertaining to one type or another has to do with the goal it is associated7 with. 
Thus, prudential norms will be associated with a prudential goal – maximizing 
practical utility – moral norms will be associated with the goal of maximizing 
moral goodness, etc. Epistemic norms will thus be concerned with guiding us in 
reaching epistemic goals. 
Think again about your driving your sister to work. The requirement 
generated there by the moral norm has traffic-related content: ‘Drive at most 30 
km/h because your sister gets carsick’. This, however, in no way makes it a 
traffic norm; this is easy to see, given that it is associated with the moral goal of 
protecting your sister from harm, rather than with the goal of safely getting to 
your destination. Similarly, prudential norms can have epistemic content; take, 
for instance, the norm: ‘Do not jump in the lake unless you know how to swim’. 
What makes this a prudential constraint rather than an epistemic one is the goal 
associated with it, which is life preservation. 
If that is the case, however, it is not clear why action in general would be 
governed by an epistemic norm to begin with. When does it make sense to 
regulate something X by a norm of type Y, such as a prudential, moral or 
epistemic norm? The overwhelmingly plausible answer is: when X has 
attaining Y as a characteristic aim. Consider antibiotics; the characteristic goal 
associated with producing them is curing bacterial infections. As such, norms 
governing this activity will plausibly be there to insure that they reliably do so. 
Conversely, when X does not have Y as a characteristic aim, there is little 
reason to regulate X by a norm of type Y. Producing antibiotics will most likely 
not be governed by, say, aesthetic norms, given that the characteristic aim 
associated with antibiotics is not to aesthetically please the consumer;
antibiotics can be proper antibiotics even if they are not particularly pretty.
Notice that most actions are not characteristically aimed at any epistemic 
goals; my eating breakfast, running in the park, brushing my teeth, buying 
chocolate, helping my old neighbour cross the street are cases in point. Most of 
them are aimed at prudential goals, such as maximizing expected practical 
utility, some of them at moral goals, maybe a few at aesthetic goals. In the 
absence of any characteristic epistemic aim associated with them, though, there 
7 Notice that the claim here is of mere association between norms and goals of a particular type; 
as such, it does not imply any substantive value-theoretic commitments. The consequentialist 
explains the ‘ought’ in terms of the ‘good’; he will say that the norm is there to guide us in 
reaching the goal. The deontologist would have it that the goal is only valuable because the 
norm gives us reasons to favour it. Anyhow, the mere association claim holds. Thus, the 
argument made by this paper can be constructed in both consequentialist and deontological 
terms; nothing here hinges on this.
7is little reason to think that these actions will be governed by an epistemic 
norm.
Consider, in contrast, asserting, perceiving, reporting, judging, learning, 
reading, applying to the university etc. These actions are all characteristically 
aimed at delivering epistemic goods. As such, it makes sense for them to be 
governed by epistemic norms. Take assertion, for instance; it looks as if, due to 
our physical and psychological limitations, a lot of the knowledge we have is 
testimonial; thus, assertion is one of our main epistemic vehicles. As such, it 
makes perfect sense that it will be governed by epistemic norms, associated 
with the characteristic epistemic goals of this speech act; that is, norms meant 
to insure that the practice of assertion delivers the epistemic goods we are using 
it for.8
Thus, having an epistemic norm for action makes perfect sense when it 
comes to actions characteristically associated with epistemic goals, like 
assertion. It makes sense to ask what property exactly one’s assertion must 
enjoy for it to be epistemically proper; that is, properly equipped to reach its
epistemic goal. However, just as in the case of producing antibiotics, there is no 
reason to think that my buying chocolate will be governed by an epistemic 
norm, due to the fact that it is not characteristically aimed at delivering 
epistemic goods. 
Now, one interesting by-product of this result concerns the assertion-action 
commonality assumption; that is, the fairly popular claim that, given that 
assertion is a type of action, the epistemic norm governing the former is going 
to be but an instance of the epistemic norm governing the latter.9 Notice that the 
above results undermine commonality, together with the motivation behind it: 
assertion is not governed by an epistemic norm in virtue of its being a type of 
action, but due to its characteristic epistemic function.
4. Action and Practical Reasoning
Say that the result above is correct; one legitimate question that arises at this 
point is: where does this leave practical reasoning? Importantly, note that 
nothing I said above affects the discussion concerning the epistemic 
normativity thereof.10
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to dive deeply into this subject 
matter, here is, very briefly, where the results above leave us: Many people 
8 See Simion (2016) for discussion.
9 See Brown (2012) for discussion.
10 Jeremy Fantl and Matt McGrath hold a view according to which propriety of practical 
reasoning and action can come apart. See fn. 3 for discussion.
8lump action and practical reasoning together when it comes to discussions of 
epistemic normativity. If this paper is right, this is likely to be a mistake that 
generates important theoretical costs. Since action in general has no epistemic 
function, it is not governed by any epistemic norm. Rather, it generally serves 
prudential aims, and is therefore governed by prudential norms. At the same 
time, of course, practical reasoning will also serve a prudential function: that of 
leading to prudentially good action. In virtue of the latter, it will also be 
governed by prudential norms. 
In contrast to action, though, practical reasoning does, arguably, also serve 
an epistemic function: generating knowledge (or true belief, or justified belief, 
whatever one’s preferred epistemic goal is) of what one ought to do, for 
instance, is one plausible candidate for the epistemic function of practical 
reasoning. If that is so, it will, arguably, afford an epistemic norm. 
But couldn’t defenders of one account or another of the epistemic norm for 
action not worry too much about the results of this paper, and merely retreat in 
a discussion about practical reasoning? Two things about this; first, I would see 
this as a great success for this paper. Secondly, and more importantly, though, 
the retreat would not be a ‘mere retreat’ at all, but it would rather require a 
fairly substantial revision of methodology. Here is why: most cases put forth in 
defense or one account or another in this literature appeal to intuitions about 
propriety of acting in a particular situation. If this paper is right, however, the 
latter says little about the epistemic propriety of practical reasoning: prudential 
propriety of an instance of practical reasoning will likely depend on the 
prudential propriety of the generated piece of action; importantly, though, 
epistemic propriety need not. Thus, arguably, on pain of deontic equivocation, 
this methodology needs be revisited: arguments pro and against one account or 
another of the epistemic norm for practical reasoning will have to stay clear of 
considerations pertaining to the propriety of the corresponding action. Again, 
though, this discussion affords a paper on its own. 
What is important for our discussion here is to note that, even if practical 
reasoning does turn out to have an epistemic function, and therefore will be 
governed by an epistemic norm, this will not transmit epistemic requirements to 
the generated action. And here is why: I take it that the transmission thought 
would go along the following lines: You ought to know that p in order to 
permissibly use p in practical reasoning (epistemic norm); You ought to only 
act on the conclusions of permissible practical reasoning; Therefore you ought 
to know that p in order to act. Now, the problem is that deontic transmission 
need not preserve the type of permissibility at stake in the premise of interest to 
us. To see this, consider, again: You ought to drive 50 km/h in order to get 
safely at your destination (traffic norm); You ought to get safely at your 
9destination in order to keep your promise to mom (moral norm); Therefore, you 
ought to drive 50 km/h in order to keep your promise to mom (moral norm). 
Even if the first premise states a traffic norm, it need not follow that the 
conclusion does too. Similarly, in the argument above, even if the first premise
states an epistemic norm, it does not follow the conclusion does too.
5. Conclusion
I have argued here that there is no epistemic norm governing action in general, 
although most actions will plausibly be governed by several other norms with 
epistemic content – like prudential or moral norms. I have also argued that, in 
order for a particular type of action to be governed by an epistemic norm, it 
needs be the case that there is a characteristic epistemic goal associated with it. 
In the light of these results, it looks as if the question concerning what one’s 
epistemic relation to p has to be in order to render acting on p permissible 
should be framed as concerning a type of normativity that plausibly governs all 
types of action. Uncontroversially, I guess, the most obvious candidate is 
prudential normativity.  Thus, what we are asking is what one’s epistemic 
relation to p has to be in order to render acting on p prudentially permissible. 
And what we are looking for is a prudential norm with epistemic content.11
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